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Security Concerns in Minimum Storage Cooperative
Regenerating Codes ?
Kun Huang1, Udaya Parampalli2, and Ming Xian1
Abstract. Here, we revisit the problem of exploring the secrecy capacity of minimum storage
cooperative regenerating (MSCR) codes under the {l1, l2}-eavesdropper model, where the eaves-
dropper can observe the data stored on l1 nodes and the repair downloads of an additional l2 nodes.
Compared to minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes which support only single node repairs,
MSCR codes allow efficient simultaneous repairs of multiple failed nodes, referred to as a repair
group. However, the repair data sent from a helper node to another failed node may vary with dif-
ferent repair groups or the sets of helper nodes, which would inevitably leak more data information
to the eavesdropper and even render the storage system unable to maintain any data secrecy.
In this paper, we introduce and study a special category of MSCR codes, termed “stable”
MSCR codes, where the repair data from any one helper node to any one failed node is required to
be independent of the repair group or the set of helper nodes. Our main contributions include: 1.
Demonstrating that two existing MSCR codes inherently are not stable and thus have poor secrecy
capacity, 2. Converting one existing MSCR code to a stable one, which offers better secrecy capacity
when compared to the original one, 3. Employing information theoretic analysis to characterize the
secrecy capacity of stable MSCR codes in certain situations.
Key Words: Stable MSCR Codes, Repair Group, Repair Data, Secrecy Capacity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSSs) are an essential infrastructure for the generation, analysis and archiv-
ing of tremendously growing data. DSSs have been becoming a fundamental and indispensable component
of those rapidly developing distributed networking applications, especially in cloud computing, social
networking and peer to peer networking. In order to guarantee DSSs’ reliability and availability, data
redundancy has to be introduced. Replication and erasure codes are two traditional approaches to offer
data redundancy, while erasure codes can achieve higher reliability for the same level of redundancy when
compared to replication [1]. Recently, Dimakis et al. [2] employ network information flow to determine
a class of regenerating codes, which has superior performance over traditional erasure codes regarding
repair efficiency.
1.1 Regenerating Codes
Regenerating codes [2] are a family of codes determined by trading off the amount of storage per node
with the repair bandwidth. In the regenerating-coding-based DSSs, an original data file of size B is
encoded into nα symbols and then distributed across n nodes. These symbols can be drawn from a finite
field Fq and each node stores α symbols. The basic features of regenerating codes are reconstruction and
regeneration properties, that is, the original data file can be retrieved by contacting any k out of n nodes
and any failed node can be recovered by permitting a new node to connect to any d helper nodes from
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the remaining (n − 1) nodes by downloading β symbols from each node. Regenerating codes are always
parameterized by {n, k, d, α, β,B} and have the following constraint (tradeoff curve):
B ≤
k∑
i=1
min{α, (d− i+ 1)β}. (1)
Most of studies now focus on the two extreme points, famous as minimum storage regenerating (MSR)
codes and minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes. As shown in [2], the parameters of the two
points are given by 
(αMSR, βMSR) = (
B
k
,
B
k(d− k + 1))
(αMBR, βMBR) = (
2dB
k(2d− k + 1) ,
2B
k(2d− k + 1)).
(2)
Besides, there are three repair models considered in the literature: functional repair, exact repair, and
exact repair of systematic nodes [3]. In contrast, exact repair is preferred in the practical systems since
the lost data in any failed nodes can be regenerated exactly [4]. In the scenario of exact repair, the authors
in [5] demonstrated the nonachievability of most interior points on the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve.
For those interior points that might be achievable, coding construction appears rarely [6,7].
So far, there are many explicit constructions with exact repair property. In [9], the authors utilize
product matrix framework to propose MBR codes for all parameters and MSR codes under the constraint
{d ≥ 2k− 2}. In the MSR scenario, much progress has been made. From a global point of view, there are
two main classes of MSR codes, namely the scalar MSR codes with {β = 1} [9,10,11,12,13,14] and vector
MSR codes with {β = (n−k)x} where x ≥ 1 [15,16,17,18,19,20,21]. Most of these constructions are heavily
built on the concept of interference alignment. According to the analysis in [14], interference alignment is
the necessity of constructing scalar linear MSR codes and these scalar linear MSR codes only exist when
d ≥ 2k − 2. These codes as well correspond to the low rate regime (i.e., kn ≤ 12n + 12 ). For designing the
high rate codes with { kn > 12}, the vector MSR codes are applicable as they are free of the parameter
constraints (n, k). However, many of these vector codes allow efficient repair of only systematic nodes
[15,17,19,20,21]. Technically speaking, those MSR codes restricted to only efficient systematic repair are
not formal MSR codes, since the formal ones require that any failed nodes including parity nodes should
be efficiently repaired. Given this concern, the authors in [16,18] present vector MSR codes allowing
efficient repair of all nodes in different ways. In addition to the repair efficiency, Zigzag code [15] has the
optimal update property and optimal access property while its variant [16] also has the optimal access
property. These two properties are of significant value to practical implementations. Furthermore, locally
repairable codes lately have attracted a lot of attention due to its practical performance [22,23,24].
As we know, all the above repair mechanisms are designed for single node failure. However, it is also
common that DSSs may experience multiple node failures. Sometimes, DSSs, such as Total Recall [8], may
take the lazy repair policy, where the repair is triggered only when the number of node failures reaches
a default threshold. Although most of the existing regenerating codes can in principle be exploited for
handling multiple node failures by sequentially applying multiple single node repair procedures, however,
they are not optimal in terms of repair bandwidth as explained in [33].
1.2 Cooperative Regenerating Codes
To allow efficient repair of multiple simultaneous node failures and further reduce the total repair over-
head, Y. Hu et al. [33] propose the cooperative regenerating codes. Different from regenerating codes, the
repair process of cooperative regenerating codes is divided into two steps which have to handle t node
failures. In the first step, t new nodes connect to any d surviving nodes, where each new node needs
to download β symbols from each helper node (surviving node). In the second step, these t new nodes
switch to a process of cooperative repair by exchanging β′ symbols with each other, where the exchanging
data actually is the function of the repair data obtained from the first repair step. In the terminology,
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the t new nodes are always called as a repair group. Later, the authors in [34,35,36] derive the tradeoff
curve between storage per node and repair bandwidth for cooperative regenerating codes. Similar to re-
generating codes, cooperative regenerating codes achieving the two end points of the trade off curve are
termed minimum bandwidth cooperative regenerating (MBCR) code and minimum storage cooperative
regenerating (MSCR) code respectively. The corresponding parameter set {n, k, d, t, α, β, β′, B} of the
two points are
(αMSCR, βMSCR, β
′
MSCR) = (
B
k
,
B
k(d− k + t) ,
B
k(d− k + t) )
(αMBCR, βMBCR, β
′
MBCR) = (
(2d+ t− 1)B
k(2d− k + t) ,
2B
k(2d− k + t) ,
B
k(2d− k + t) ).
(3)
Here, we make a comparison on repair bandwidth between MSR and MSCR codes. Assume that there is
a storage system with {n, k, d,B} and t is the threshold on the number of failed nodes. For MSR codes,
every one of t failed nodes needs to contact any d out of (n− t) surviving nodes and downloads the repair
data, which totally produces tdBk(d−k+1) repair bandwidth. For MSCR codes, recovering all the t failed
nodes needs t(d+t−1)Bk(d−k+t) repair bandwidth in total. By contrast, it is apparent that when t > 1,
t(d+ t− 1)B
k(d− k + t) <
tdB
k(d− k + 1) , (4)
which exactly means that MSCR codes are advantageous over MSR codes when repairing multiple node
failures. However, there are not many constructions of cooperative regenerating codes up to now.
Authors in [37,38,39] present explicit constructions of MBCR codes and the code proposed in [39]
is built for all parameter settings. In the MSCR scenario, there are only a few constructions [40,41,42].
The construction in [40] is based on the special parameter settings that k = t = 2 and the one in [41]
is limited to the case d = k. In [42], the authors establish an equivalent connection between exact MSR
codes and exact MSCR codes, such that linear scalar exact MSCR codes with {n, k, d− 1, t = 2} can be
built from any instance of linear scalar exact MSR codes with {n, k, d}.
Despite the above crucial issues on node failures in DSSs, there always exist security problems since
massive storage nodes are widely spread across the network. Accordingly, it will be preferable to incor-
porate security requirements during the design of the cooperative-regenerating-coding based DSSs. Our
concern in this paper is the data secrecy of MSCR-coding-based DSSs.
1.3 Secrecy Concerns in DSSs
The active attacker and passive attacker models are the two usual adversary models considered in the
literature [25]. For the active adversary model, the attacker can take operations on certain compromised
nodes such as modifying, injecting and deleting. In this paper, we focus on the passive adversary model,
where an adversary can only eavesdrop the data stored on some l1 nodes and repair downloads for other
l2 nodes.
Related work (secure regenerating codes): The authors in [26] and [27] firstly investigate the
problem of designing secure DSSs against eavesdropping. In [26], the authors analyze the secrecy capacity
of regenerating codes, based on an initial adversary model where the contents of l < k nodes are eaves-
dropped. They derive an upper bound of the secrecy capacity and propose a secure MBR coding scheme
that can attain this bound:
B(s) ≤
k∑
i=l+1
min{α, (d− i+ 1)β}. (5)
Afterwards, the authors in [27] extend the initial eavesdropping model considered in [26], where the
eavesdropper can also observe the repair downloads for additional l2 nodes apart from the data stored on
the initial l1 nodes, with the constraint that l1 + l2 < k. The secure product-matrix-based MBR coding
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scheme proposed in [27] is shown to achieve the bound (5) only by changing l into l1+l2. The achievability
follows from the fact that the repair bandwidth dβ is equal to per node storage α in the MBR scenario.
Furthermore, the authors in [27] considered designing secure product-matrix-based MSR codes, but the
secrecy capacity of their secure MSR coding scheme is only (k− l1 − l2)(α− l2β), which is evidently less
than (k− l1− l2)α when l2 > 0 given in the bound (5). The reason is that the amount of repair downloads
dβ is larger than the per node storage α = (d − k + 1)β and thus the (l1, l2)-eavesdropper can obtain
more information in addition to the contents of (l1 + l2) nodes in the MSR scenario.
Recently, the authors in [28] and [29] employ the analysis of linear subspace intersection and then
derive new upper bounds on secrecy capacity for MSR codes. Zigzag code [15] and its variant [16] are
shown to achieve these new bounds through pre-coding of maximum rank distance (MRD) code [31,32].
The bounds given in [29] match to those in [28] when l2 ≤ 2. Thereafter, we [30] utilize the information
theoretic analysis to give some novel results on the secrecy capacity for MSR codes, which includes some
new insights on general MSR codes and provides generalized bounds on secrecy capacity for linear MSR
codes. Thereby, we demonstrate that the secure product-matrix-based MSR codes given in [27] are also
optimal whenever l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1 and l2 ≤ d − k + 1. The final outcome on secrecy capacity of linear
MSR codes that we present in [30] exhibits to be closely related to the parameter β and applies to all
known MSR codes including the scalar MSR codes as well as the vector MSR codes like Zigzag code [15].
Moreover, it is also applicable to those unexplored vector MSR codes with parameters {1 < β < d−k+1}.
Furthermore, we find that all of these results also apply to systematic MSR codes with repair data of
systematic nodes captured.
Related work (secure cooperative regenerating codes): In [43], the authors pioneer the research
of secrecy capacity of cooperative regenerating codes by min-cut analysis. Similar to MBR codes, the total
repair bandwidth of MBCR codes under a repair group is also identical to the total storage of the t failed
nodes. Thus, the secrecy capacity of MBCR codes are fully characterized under the {l1, l2}-eavesdropping
model. For MSCR codes, they derived some results on secrecy capacity in some special cases and claimed
that the two existing MSCR codes [40,41] can be transformed into secure MSCR codes. However, they
only considered the information leakage under single repair group and neglected an important detail of
the repair property in the MSCR scenario. 1Due to different repair groups involving a node whose repair
downloads are eavesdropped, the eavesdropper may obtain different repair data sent from a helper node
to this eavesdropped node, which will definitely result in more information leakage. Even worse, it may
be impossible for storage system to keep any data secrecy after traversing all possible repair groups. Let
us briefly describe it as follows.
Suppose there is an MSCR-coding-based DSS specified by {n, k, d, t = 2, B} and the repair downloads
of node 1 is observed by the eavesdropper. We let S
1(1,i)
j denotes the repair data sent from the surviving
node j to the failed node 1 under the repair group (1, i), where i 6= j. However, if storage system
successively undergoes two different repair groups (1, i1) and (1, i2) where i1 6= i2 and S1(1,i1)j 6= S
1(1,i2)
j ,
the eavesdropper will observe more data information. In the worst case, the eavesdropper may obtain all
the original data information only needing to wait for traversing all possible repair groups including node
1. Thus, it will be difficult or even impossible to retain the data secrecy if this kind of MSCR codes is
used.
Contributions: In this work, we study the data secrecy issue of MSCR codes under the {l1, l2}-
eavesdropper model. Considering the possible impacts on security mentioned above, we introduce a new
class of MSCR codes, termed “stable” MSCR codes, where the repair data is restricted to be independent
of repair group and the set of helper nodes. In order to elaborate the importance of this “stable” property
to security, we reanalyze the two existing MSCR codes [40,41]. We demonstrate that they both inherently
are not stable. The MSCR code given in [40] actually offers no secrecy at all under the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-
1 Although a node in different repair groups appears in different repair scenarios and corresponds to distinct
newcomer nodes, these distinct newcomer nodes corresponding to the same node must appear separately and
cannot exist simultaneously in the storage system. Since in the model, the eavesdropper is defined to be capable
of observing the repair downloads of certain nodes at the same time, these newcomer nodes corresponding to
the same node that, however, cannot appear simultaneously, thus can be viewed as one node if eavesdropped.
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eavesdropper model, which makes it impossible to be transformed into a secure MSCR code. In addition,
we find that the other MSCR code given in [41] has poor secrecy capacity, even also losing any data secrecy
in some cases. Subsequently, we convert the MSCR code given in [41] to a stable one via adjusting its
repair strategy.
Then, we turn to investigate the secrecy capacity of stable MSCR codes. Based on precoding using
MRD codes, we give an information theoretic expression of secrecy capacity for general MSCR codes. By
studying the basic properties of reconstruction and multiple simultaneous regenerations for general MSCR
codes and stable MSCR codes, we derive a series of information theoretic features on the contents of node’s
storage and the repair downloads. Afterwards, combining these features with the secrecy expression, we
present a simple expression of secrecy capacity for stable MSCR codes and some specific characterizations
on secrecy capacity. A similar result given in [43] is a special case of ours when d = k, while the authors
therein only considered under single repair group. Finally, we calculate the specific secrecy capacity of
the stable MSCR code built from conversion, which is consistent with our information theoretic results
on secrecy capacity and is clearly better than that of the original unstable one.
1.4 Organization
Section 2 gives preliminaries about system model and adversary model from information theoretic per-
spective. Section 3 exhibits the detailed illustration of two existing MSCR codes. Section 4 presents some
basic information theoretic properties of general MSCR codes and stable MSCR codes. Section 5 provides
main results on secrecy capacity of stable MSCR codes. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the system model and the eavesdropping model from information theoretic
perspective. In addition, we give the definition of “stable” MSCR codes.
A. Repair Terminology : Consider a DSS consisting of n storage nodes. After t nodes fail, t new
nodes are introduced to replace these failed nodes. These t new nodes constitute a repair group. Each
new node connects to any d same surviving nodes and downloads β symbols from each of these d nodes.
In the cooperative repair phase, each new node contacts the other t − 1 new nodes in the same repair
group and downloads β′ symbols from each of these nodes. So, the nodes participating in a failed node’s
repair can be categorized into surviving nodes (the d helper nodes) and cooperative nodes (the other t−1
new nodes). In addition, the repair downloads involved in the system also can be divided into “repair
data” (from the surviving nodes) and “exchanging data” (from the cooperative nodes). Here, it should
be noted that the exchanging data is not necessarily the function of the data stored in the original failed
node and actually is the function of the repair data of the corresponding new node.
The following is the parameter notation of cooperative regenerating codes {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′},
which is reduced to the scenario of regenerating codes when t = 1. Based on the repair process, there are
totally
(
n
t
)
possible different repair groups. Fig.1 describes the basic system model with some parameters.
B. Parameter Notations: Given any cooperative regenerating code with parameter set {n ≥ d +
t, k, d, t, α, β, β′}, we let
(1) Wi, i ∈ [1, n] denote the random variable corresponding to the content of node i, which has that
H(Wi) = α.
(2) {WA, A ⊆ [1, n]} denote the set of random variables corresponding to the nodes in the subset A.
Throughout the paper, subscripts of W can represent either a node index or a set of nodes which will be
clear from the context.
(3) Sji , {i, j} ⊂ [1, n], i 6= j denote the random variable corresponding to the symbols of repair data
sent by the surviving node i to new node j, where H(Sji ) = β.
(4) SBA denote the set {Sji |i ∈ A, j ∈ B, i 6= j, A ⊆ [1, n], B ⊆ [1, n]}, and particularly SB substitutes
for SB[1,n].
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Fig. 1. C = (i1, · · · , it) is one repair group and D = (j1, j2, · · · , jd) is one set of helper nodes, where C is
disjoint with D. In the first repair phase, each new node in C downloads β symbols from each helper node
in D, i.e., (Si1D , · · · , SitD). In the cooperative repair phase, each new node mutually exchange β′ symbols, i.e.,
(Si1C\{i1}, · · · , S
it
C\{it}). Thus, the total repair downloads for each new node in C is {S
il
D, S
il
C\{il}} for 1 ≤ l ≤ t,
which is used to recover Wil the original storage of failed node il.
(5) Sji , {i, j} ⊂ [1, n], i 6= j denote the random variable corresponding to the symbols of exchanging
data sent by the new node i to another new node j, when node i and node j are in the same repair
group, where H(Sji ) = β
′.
(6) SBA denote the set {Sji |i ∈ A, j ∈ B, i 6= j, A ⊆ [1, n], B ⊆ [1, n]}.
Remark 1 Compared to regenerating codes, cooperative regenerating codes have another parameter that
is the exchanging data Sji . According to the above notation of the exchanging data S
j
i and the procedure
of the cooperative repair, it must be that, for any repair group C and any helper nodes set D where i ∈ C
and D ⊆ [1, n] \ C, {
H(S
C\{i}
i |SiD) = 0
H(Wi|SiD, SiC\{i}) = 0,
(6)
where the first term means that exchanging data S
C\{i}
i is the function of the repair data of node i and
the second term implies that node i can be regenerated by the repair data SiD as well as the exchanging
data SiC\{i}.
In addition, for any {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′} MSCR code, it must be an MDS code (reconstruction
property) and have the regeneration property that any t failed nodes can be repaired simultaneously. These
two basic properties can be expressed as {
H
({Wij}kj=1) = kα
H(WC |SCD) = 0,
(7)
where C and D are defined as equation (6). When n = d+ t, D is unique after the choice of C.
C. Eavesdropping Model : We consider an {l1, l2}-eavesdropper, which has access to the storage
contents of nodes in set E and additionally can observe the repair downloads of nodes in set F , where
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|E| = l1, |F | = l2 and l1 + l2 < k. Besides, we set G to be another nodes set of size (k − l1 − l2), where
G ⊆ [1, n]\(E ∪ F ).
However, different from regenerating codes, the repair downloads of any one node in F here are
comprised of the repair data from d helper nodes and the exchanging data from t− 1 cooperative nodes.
As shown in Figure. 2, there are totally
(
n−1
t−1
)
possible sets of the cooperative nodes after deciding one
failed node and
(
n−t
d
)
possible helper nodes sets after determining a repair group. Thus, after traversing
all possible repair groups and the sets of helper nodes, the {l1, l2}-eavesdropper is supposed to have the
knowledge {
WE , {SiD, SiC\{i}|i ∈ C ∩ F,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n] \ C, |C| = t, |D| = d}
}
, (8)
where C⊂˜[1, n] indicates that C traverses [1, n] and so does D. For brevity, we substitute {SiD, SiC\{i}|i ∈
C ∩F,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n]\C, |C| = t, |D| = d} for S˜F and thus {WE , S˜F } is the data information leakage
obtained by eavesdropper. In [43], the authors only consider the eavesdropping model under single repair
group.
2{ , }F l1{ , }E l 1 2{ , }G k l l 
1 1l 1 1l  1 2l l 1 2 1l l  k 1k  n
Repair Downloads of node         
Nodes under eavesdropping
given a repair group      and a helper nodes set 
: One repair group
: One set of helper nodes D
C
1 1l  C D
11
1
11
\{ 1}{ , }
ll
C lDS S


Fig. 2. E is the nodes set whose contents are eavesdropped and F is the nodes set whose repair downloads
are observed by eavesdropper. Given a repair group C including node l1 + 1 and a set of helper nodes D,
red lines indicate the repair data Sl1+1D and blue lines stand for the exchanging data S
l1+1
C\{l1+1}, which con-
stitute the total repair downloads of failed node l1 + 1. For all possible repair groups and the sets of helper
nodes, the repair downloads of node l1 + 1 that the eavesdropper may obtain is {Sl1+1D , Sl1+1C\{l1+1}|l1 + 1 ∈
C,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n] \ C}. Thus, for the eavesdropped nodes set E and F , the total information may leaked to
eavesdropper is
{
WE , {SlD, SlC\{l}|l ∈ F, l ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n] \ C}
}
.
D. Security Consideration: Based on the above eavesdropping model, we consider a special class
of MSCR codes, where the repair data sent from any surviving node i to a new node j is independent
of the choice of the other t − 1 cooperative nodes and the other d − 1 helper nodes. That is to say, the
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content of single repair data Sji is fixed and only depends on the helper node index i and the failed node
index j. However, we do not restrict the content of exchanging data Sji also to be invariant, i.e., it may
vary depending on different repair groups including both nodes i and j. Nevertheless, we will show that it
does not matter if the exchanging data is restricted to be fixed or not, when considering the total amount
of information leakage.
As discussed before, this restriction of repair data is important for the MSCR codes to be secure,
since the {l1, l2}-eavesdropper can get access to the repair downloads of the nodes in F . Otherwise, the
changing contents of repair data {Sji , j ∈ F} will cause more information leakage due to different repair
groups or different sets of helper nodes, which is certain analogous to the situation of functional repair
and may make it impossible to maintain the security of MSCR codes. Based on this security concern, we
define such an MSCR code as
Definition 1. (Stable MSCR Code): A stable MSCR code with {n ≥ d + t, k, d, t, α, β, β′} is an MSCR
code with the “stable” repair property, that is, for arbitrary repair group C including j and arbitrary set
of helper nodes D including i, the content of repair data Sji is independent of the choices of C and D,
where i 6= j ∈ [1, n].
In next section, we will reconsider the two MSCR codes [40,41], while the authors in [43] only consid-
ered under single repair group and neglected this “stable” property of MSCR codes.
3 ILLUSTRATION OF EXISTING MSCR CODES
In this section, we reanalyze the secrecy capacity of the two MSCR codes [40,41], whose detail on the
stable property is overlooked in [43]. Both MSCR codes [40,41] will be shown not stable. The MSCR
code proposed in [40] will be further shown impossible to be transformed into a secure MSCR code under
the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropping model. As for the one in [41], its original repair procedure is also not
stable, but it can be converted to a stable one through adjusting the repair strategy.
3.1 Unstable MSCR Codes
Here, we take the two MSCR codes as examples and explain why they are not stable and why it is hard
or even impossible for them to maintain the data secrecy under the {l1, l2}-eavesdropping model.
3.1.1 MSCR-Code-A. The authors in [43] first investigated the secrecy capacity of the MSCR code [40]
with special parameter {d ≥ k = t = 2}. Under the constraint that l1+l2 < k = 2, they analyzed two cases
respectively, i.e., {l1 = 1, l2 = 0} and {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}. The first case {l1 = 1, l2 = 0} is trivial, as there
is only some node’s content undergoing eavesdropped and does not involve the information leakage of
repair downloads. Thus, the construction of secure MSCR code under the {l1 = 1, l2 = 0}-eavesdropping
model given in [43] is correct.
As for the second case {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}, they considered under single repair group made of two
systematic nodes. However, they overlooked the fact that the content of the repair data transferred for
one systematic node, changes with different repair groups which could include the same systematic node
but another parity node. In the following, we first describe the coding scheme and the repair strategy as
given in [40], then we show that this code in [40] cannot be transformed into a secure MSCR code under
the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropping model.
• Coding Scheme: The coding scheme is specified by {k = t = 2, β = 1}, from which it has the
special parameter setting with {α = d− k+ t = d = n− 2, B = k(d− k+ t) = 2α}. Keeping the notation
used in [43], the procedure is described as follows:
∗: a = (a1, a2, · · · , aα)T is systematically stored in the first node.
∗: b = (b1, b2, · · · , bα)T is systematically stored in the second node.
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∗: ri = (a1+ω(i−1) mod αb1, · · · , aα+ω(i+α−2) mod αbα)T is stored in ith parity node, where i ∈ [1, d]
and ω is the generator of a finite field Fq. For convenient index, the ith parity node is marked as the
(i+ 2)th node, i ∈ [1, d]. By matrix representation, ri = a + Bib, where Bi is the corresponding diagonal
matrix.
• Repair Strategy: The detailed coding construction can be referred to [40] and we only care
about its repair process. As described in [40], they only consider the repair group comprised of two
systematic nodes. Other repair groups including parity node can be performed as the two systematic
nodes after change of variables. Assume the repair downloads of the first node (node 1) is observed by
the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropper. Under repair group (1, 2), the repair data sent from the jth parity
node to node 1 is given by {
S
1(1,2)
j+2 : v
T
1,jrj = z
TB−1j rj = z
TB−1j a +
︷︸︸︷
zTb
}
, (9)
where they set z = (1, · · · , 1)T and
︷︸︸︷
zTb is termed an interference needing canceling out.
Now, we consider other situations when a repair group is comprised of the first node and the ith
parity node where i 6= j. As suggested, we should view {a, ri} or {1, i+ 2} as two systematic nodes. For
simplicity, we let x = a and y = ri. After changing variables, we have{
b = −B−1i x + B−1i y
rj = (I−BjB−1i )x + BjB−1i y,
(10)
where I is the identical matrix. In order to ensure the alignment of interference, the jth parity node now
should send to node 1 under repair group (1, i+ 2) by{
S
1(1,i+2)
j+2 : v
′T
1,jrj = z
TBiB
−1
j rj = z
T (BiB
−1
j − I)x +
︷︸︸︷
zTy = zTBi(B
−1
j a + b)
}
, (11)
where
︷︸︸︷
zTy now is viewed as an interference. Similarly, the second systematic node (whose storage is b)
should send to node 1 under repair group (1, i+ 2) by{
S
1(1,i+2)
2 : z
TBib = z
TBi(−B−1i x + B−1i y) = −zTx +
︷︸︸︷
zTy
}
, (12)
where
︷︸︸︷
zTy needs to be canceled out.
• Data Eavesdropped: Under the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropping model, when the repair downloads
of node 1 is eavesdropped, the total data eavesdropped (that in fact is all the repair downloads of node
1 under all possible repair groups) is comprised of the repair data of node 1 from the helper nodes and
the exchanging data from the corresponding cooperative nodes. As shown in [43], under the single repair
group made of two systematic nodes (1, 2), the information symbols observed by the eavesdropper is given
by {
zT
(
ν(ω0 + ω1 · · ·+ ωα−1)−1a + b), zT (B−11 a + b), zT (B−12 a + b), · · · , zT (B−1d a + b)} , (13)
where zT
(
ν(ω0 + ω1 · · · + ωα−1)−1a + b) is the exchanging data from node 2. Next, we will show that,
the already obtained content of node 1 combined with the repair data sent from any one helper node
to node 1 after traversing all possible repair groups are enough for eavesdropper to retrieve all the data
information. In other words, only needing the repair downloads of node 1 under any one repair group
and all the repair data sent from node j + 2 to node 1 under all possible repair groups, the eavesdropper
can recover all the original data information.
9
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Fig. 3. Under different repair groups including node 1, the node j + 2 (or the jth parity node) sends different
contents of repair data S1j+2 to node 1, which will leak more data information to the eavesdropper.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, after traversing all possible repair groups including node 1, the eavesdropper
can totally obtain (d = α)-sized repair data from the jth parity node to the first node that are{
[S
1(1,2)
j+2 , S
1(1,i+2)
j+2 ] = [z
T (B−1j a + b), z
TBi(B
−1
j a + b)] | i 6= j ∈ [1, d]
}
, (14)
which is equivalent to
(aTB−1j + b
T ) · [z,B1z, · · · ,Bj−1z,Bj+1z, · · · ,Bdz]. (15)
Here, it should be noted that the eavesdropper not merely can obtain the repair data sent from the jth
parity node as the formula (15), but also can observe other repair downloads including the repair data
and the exchanging data which are sent from other helper nodes and cooperative nodes. Although the
information leakage as in the formula (15) differs from the formula (13) given in [43], it is now clear
for us that both information leakage formulas (13) and (15) actually are only parts of the total data
eavesdropped under all possible repair groups. The reason of here only considering the repair data sent
from the jth parity node as the formula (15) is that, the eavesdropper has been able to sufficiently decode
the original data information, only using the already known content of a and these information symbols
of the repair data as the formula (15). It is illustrated as follows.
Required by the coding construction in [40], the following α× α matrix
[z,B−11 z, · · · ,B−1j−1z,B−1j+1z, · · · ,B−1d z], (16)
should be invertible, which, as stated in [43], can be guaranteed by the condition that q > n − 1 and
(ω0 + · · · + ωα−1)2ω−(α−1) /∈ {0, α2}. Actually, based on this condition, we can also deduce that the
following matrix from the formula (15)
[z,B1z, · · · ,Bj−1z,Bj+1z, · · · ,Bdz] (17)
is invertible2.
2 Proof : First, B−1i is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are {ω(1−i) mod α, · · · , ω(2−i−α) mod α}. Then,
matrix (17) can be equivalently transformed into matrix (16), if ω−1 is regarded as the generator of the finite
field Fq. At last, if ω−1 satisfies (ω0 + ω−1 · · · + ω1−α)2ω(α−1) /∈ {0, α2}, matrix (17) is invertible. For this,
we can easily find the clue that (ω0 + ω−1 · · · + ω1−α)2ω(α−1) = (ω0 + ω−1 · · · + ω1−α)2(ω(α−1))2ω−(α−1) =
[(ω0 + ω−1 · · ·+ ω1−α)ω(α−1)]2ω−(α−1) = (ω0 + · · ·+ ωα−1)2ω−(α−1).
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Therefore, the eavesdropper can obtain the content of (aTB−1j +b
T ) just only by solving the equation
(15). In fact, the content of (aTB−1j + b
T ) include all the storage information of node j + 2, since
rj = a + Bjb. Then, combining the already obtained content of a under any one repair group, he thus
can obtain the content of b. That is to say, the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropper can obtain all the information
of the original data message (a,b), as long as by observing the repair downloads of node 1 which undergoes
all the repair groups (1, l) for l ∈ [1, d + 2] \ {1, j + 2}. In this case, we cannot implement one-time pad
scheme to encrypt or randomize secure information symbols as used in [43], since all the information
symbols have been eavesdropped and there are no secure information symbols left. Hence, this MSCR
code in [40] cannot be transformed into a secure MSCR code under the {l1 = 0, l2 = 1}-eavesdropping
model.
3.1.2 MSCR-Code-B. The authors in [43] then investigated the secrecy capacity of MSCR code given
in [41] with {d = k, α = t, β = 1}, which actually is also not stable.
• Coding Deployment: As shown in [41], the k · t original data packets are deployed in a t × k
data matrix M and its row representation is denoted by (mT1 ,m
T
2 , · · · ,mTt ). Consider a k× n generator
matrix
G =

1 1 1 · · · 1
a1 a2 a3 · · · an
...
...
...
. . .
...
ak−11 a
k−1
2 a
k−1
3 · · · ak−1n
 , (18)
of which every k × k submatrix is a non-singular Vandermonde matrix. Then encode the original data
matrix into MG and the encoded data packets stored in node j are {mTi gj |i = 1, 2, · · · , t}, where gj is
the jth column of G.
• Repair Strategy: When t nodes are failed, t new nodes contact any other d = k surviving nodes,
where the t new nodes are indexed by {f1, · · · , ft} and the k helper nodes are indexed by {λ1, · · · , λk}.
Each helper node λl sends its jth packet to the new node fj with m
T
j gλl , for l ∈ [1, k]. Because of the
property of Vandermonde matrix, mTj can be recovered by reversing the matrix [gλ1 ,gλ2 , · · · ,gλk ]. In
the cooperative repair phase, the new node fj sends m
T
j gfi to another new node fi, for i 6= j ∈ [1, t].
Thus, the new node fj can receive t − 1 data packets {mTi gfj |i 6= j ∈ [1, t]} during cooperative repair
phase. Combining the previously obtained mTj , the initial state of node fj can be recovered.
• Data Eavesdropped: According to the repair process, we find that the repair data from a helper
node λl to a new node fj is m
T
j gλl , where j ∈ [1, t] and fj ∈ [1, n]. That implies the mapping of fj is not
bijective. Besides, there are totally
(
n
t
)
possible repair groups. So, there must exist two different repair
groups {f1, · · · , ft} and {f ′1, · · · , f ′t}, where fj 6= f ′j and {Sfjλl = S
f ′j
λl
= mTj gλl} for some j. However,
when node fj and f
′
j are in the same repair group, S
fj
λl
and S
f ′j
λl
cannot be equal to mTj gλl simultaneously.
In other words, we cannot guarantee that repair data from any helper node to any failed node is always
fixed, which exactly means this MSCR code is not stable and will leak more data information if the
eavesdropper can observe the repair downloads of the corresponding node.
As shown in Fig. 4, for repair group [1, t], we set S
i[1,t]
t+2 = m
T
i gt+2 for i ∈ [1, t]. For another repair
group [2, t+ 1], we set S
t+1[2,t+1]
t+2 = m
T
1 gt+2 and {Si[2,t+1]t+2 = mTi gt+2 for i ∈ [2, t]. However, when node 1
and node t+ 1 are in the same repair group such as [1, 3, · · · , t+ 1], S1[1,3,··· ,t+1]t+2 and S
t+1[1,3,··· ,t+1]
t+2 cannot
equal with mT1 gt+2 simultaneously.
As stated in [41], any t new nodes are put in order by their serial numbers. In fact, such an order
arrangement is the least secure way. For example, if n ≥ 2t + k − 1, when repair group [1, t] gradually
traverse to repair group [t, 2t− 1], the repair data sent to node t from helper nodes set [2t, 2t+ k − 1] is
given by
{St[i,t−1+i]λ = mTt+1−igλ | i ∈ [1, t], λ ∈ [2t, 2t+ k − 1]} = {mT1 gλ, · · · ,mTt gλ|λ ∈ [2t, 2t+ k − 1]}, (19)
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Fig. 4. In the repair group [1, t], S1t+2 = m
T
1 gt+2. In the repair group [2, t + 1], S
t+1
t+2 = m
T
1 gt+2. However, in
the repair group [1, 3, · · · , t+ 1], we can only set {S1t+2 = mT1 gt+2, St+1t+2 = mT2 gt+2} or {S1t+2 = mT2 gt+2, St+1t+2 =
mT1 gt+2}, which indicates one of repair data S1t+2 and St+1t+2 must change its content. If the eavesdropper observes
repair downloads of the node that has changing contents of repair data, it will obviously obtain more data
information.
which, if observed by eavesdropper, can be used to decode all the original data packets (m1,m2, · · · ,mt)
since [g2t, · · · ,g2t+k−1] is invertible. It means that the eavesdropper can obtain all the original data
information only by observing the repair data of node t involved in repair groups as many as possible.
Remark 2 Although the MSCR code given in [41] is not stable and possesses poor secrecy capacity, it
can be converted to a stable one by adjusting its repair strategy, which will offer better secrecy capacity.
3.2 A Stable MSCR Code
In this section, we will present a stable MSCR code built from conversion of repair strategy based on the
MSCR code given in [41].
We apply the same coding deployment but change the repair strategy, where the main purpose is
to make the content of repair data S
fj
λl
invariant to the choice of helper node λl and failed node fj .
In other words, we need to ensure the bijection between indices of failed nodes and repair data pack-
ets given by a helper node. Thus, after the coding deployment, we consider a systematic MDS code
(m′1,m
′
2, · · · ,m′t,m′t+1, · · · ,m′n) which is extended by the original data packets (m1,m2, · · · ,mt), where
(m′1,m
′
2, · · · ,m′t) = (m1,m2, · · · ,mt). For this, we can use a t× n generator matrix G′
G′ =

1 0 · · · 0 ν1,t+1 ν1,t+2 · · · ν1,n
0 1 · · · 0 ν2,t+1 ν2,t+2 · · · ν2,n
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1 νt,t+1 νt,t+2 · · · νt,n
 , (20)
of which every t× t submatrix is invertible. We let g′j denotes the jth column of G′. Here, it should be
noted that G is a k × n matrix, while G′ is a t× n matrix. So, we have
[m1,m2, · · · ,mt] ·G′ = [m′1,m′2, · · · ,m′t,m′t+1, · · · ,m′n], (21)
from which we can derive, for any i ∈ [1, n− t],
m′t+i = [m1,m2, · · · ,mt] · g′t+i = ν1,t+im1 + ν2,t+im2 + · · ·+ νt,t+imt. (22)
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The following is the new repair strategy which is also shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Given a repair group {f1, · · · , ft} and a set of helper nodes {λ1, · · · , λk}, m′Tfjgλl is the repair data sent
from node λl to node fj . Subsequently, each new node fj sends m
′T
fj
gfi to another new node fi, where i 6= j ∈ [1, t].
Each new node is then recovered exactly, by combining all the repair data and the exchanging data.
Step 1. For any repair group {f1, · · · , ft} and any set of helper nodes {λ1, · · · , λk}, each helper node
λl sends to the new node fj with (m
T
1 gλl , · · · ,mTt gλl) · g′fj , where
(mT1 gλl , · · · ,mTt gλl) · g′fj
= g′Tfj · (mT1 gλl , · · · ,mTt gλl)T
= g′Tfj · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · gλl
= ([m1,m2, · · · ,mt] · g′fj )T · gλl
= m′Tfj gλl ,
(23)
where (mT1 gλl , · · · ,mTt gλl) is the exact original storage of node λl and m′Tfj is from equation (21). So,
the repair data {Sfjλl = m′Tfj gλl} now actually is the linear combination of storage in node λl, while the
original repair data is mTj gλl (the jth data packet of node λl). Furthermore, due to the invertiblity of
any k × k submatrix [gλ1 , · · · ,gλk ] of G, the linear combination of original data m′Tfj is obtained.
Step 2. In the cooperative repair phase, the new node fj sends exchanging data m
′T
fj
gfi to other new
nodes fi, for i 6= j ∈ [1, t]. Hence, the new node fj can receive t− 1 data packets {m′Tfi gfj |i 6= j ∈ [1, t]}
in this phase.
Step 3. At last, node fj combines the repair data and exchanging data {m′Tfj ,m′Tfi gfj |i 6= j ∈ [1, t]}
to obtain {m′Tfi gfj |i ∈ [1, t]}, which can be further expressed as
[m′f1 ,m
′
f2 , · · · ,m′ft ]T · gfj
=
{
[m1,m2, · · · ,mt] · [g′f1 ,g′f2 , · · · ,g′ft ]
}T · gfj
= [g′f1 ,g
′
f2 , · · · ,g′ft ]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · gfj
= [g′f1 ,g
′
f2 , · · · ,g′ft ]T · (mT1 gfj , · · · ,mTt gfj )T ,
(24)
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where (mT1 gfj , · · · ,mTt gfj ) is the original storage of node fj . As any t × t submatrix [g′f1 ,g′f2 , · · · ,g′ft ]
of G′ is invertible, node fj can be recovered.
Remark 3 According to the above new repair strategy, it is obvious that the content of repair data from
any helper node λl to any failed node fj (S
fj
λl
= m′Tfj gλl = (m
T
1 gλl , · · · ,mTt gλl) · g′fj ) is independent of
repair groups and sets of helper nodes. So, this MSCR code built from conversion of repair strategy is a
stable MSCR code.
In subsequent discussion, we study the secrecy capacity of stable MSCR codes from information
theoretic perspective. Besides, we will use the above stable MSCR code to calculate its specific secrecy
capacity.
4 INFORMATION THEORETIC FEATURES OF MSCR CODES
In this section, we first present a generally applicable secrecy expression for MSCR codes. Then, we
present some information theoretic features based on the basic reconstruction and regeneration properties
of general MSCR and stable MSCR codes.
4.1 Expression of Secrecy Capacity
As assumed in eavesdropping model, the {l1, l2}-eavesdropper has access to the following information
{WE , S˜F } =
{
WE , {SiD, SiC\{i}|i ∈ C ∩ F,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n] \ C, |C| = t, |D| = d}
}
. (25)
Similar to the definition of secrecy capacity of MSR codes [30], we have the following result.
Lemma 1. For any MSCR code with parameter set {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′}, we have
B(s)
= H(WE ,WF ,WG|WE , S˜F )
= H(WG|WE ,WF )−H(S˜F |WE ,WF )
= (k − l1 − l2)α−H(S˜F |WE ,WF )
(26)
Proof. First, we can use the MRD codes [32] (e.g. Gabidulin code [31]) to pre-code the original data file
of size {B = kα}, which is required to consist of {B−H(WE , S˜F )}-sized secure data file and H(WE , S˜F )-
sized random data file. As shown in [27,28,43], this kind of construction of secure codes always can meet
the conditions of secrecy3, which exactly means the maximal file size that can be securely stored is
B(s) = B −H(WE , S˜F ) = H(WE ,WF ,WG|WE , S˜F ). (27)
Second, we can deduce
H(WG|WE ,WF )−H(WE ,WF ,WG|WE , S˜F )
= H(WG|WE ,WF )−H(WE ,WF ,WG|WE ,WF , S˜F )
= H(WG|WE ,WF )−H(WG|WE ,WF , S˜F )
= I(WG; S˜
F |WE ,WF )
= H(S˜F |WE ,WF )−H(S˜F |WE ,WF ,WG)
= H(S˜F |WE ,WF ).
(28)
3 Consider a DSS with data file fs, random data file r (independent of fs), and an eavesdropper with observations
given by e. If H(e) ≤ H(r) and H(r|fs, e) = 0, then the mutual information leakage to eavesdropper is zero,
i.e., I(fs; e) = 0.
14
Then, for the MSCR codes, we further have H(WG|WE ,WF ) = (k− l1− l2)α, where α = (d−k+ t)β.
Combining these equations, we get the proof.
Remark 4 Based on this definition of secrecy capacity, we only need to calculate or estimate the value
of H(S˜F |WE ,WF ).
4.2 Properties of General MSCR Codes
We present some properties of MSCR codes as below.
Lemma 2. For any MSCR code with parameter set {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′} where t ≤ k, consider any
three pairwise disjoint subsets A, B and C with {|C| = t, |A| = k − t, |B| = d− k + t}, it must be that{
H(SCA∪B) = dtβ
H(SCB |WC , SCA ) = 0. (29)
Proof. We present them as follows.
1. Because MSCR codes are the storage efficient codes with the MDS property, it is trivial that
H(WC |SCA ) = H(WC) = tα since |A|+ |C| = k and A ∩ C = Ø.
2. Set B = {b1, b2, · · · , bd−k+t}. From equation (7), we know H(WC |SCA∪B) = 0. Now, we have
H(WC |SCA )−H(WC |SCA , SCb1)
= I(WC ;S
C
b1 |SCA )
= H(SCb1 |SCA )−H(SCb1 |WC , SCA )
≤ H(SCb1)
≤ tβ;
...
...
H(WC |SCA , SCb1 , SCb2 , · · · , SCbd−k+t−1)−H(WC |SCA , SCB )
= I(WC ;S
C
bd−k+t |SCA , SCB\{bd−k+t})
= H(SCbd−k+t |SCA , SCB\{bd−k+t})−H(SCbd−k+t |WC , SCA , SCB\{bd−k+t})
≤ H(SCbd−k+t)
≤ tβ.
(30)
By summing up the inequalities, we derive
tα = H(WC |SCA )−H(WC |SCA , SCB ) ≤ (d− k + t)tβ. (31)
Because α = (d− k + t)β, it is mandatory that all the inequalities (30) actually are equations. Thus,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− k + t, we all have {
H(SCbi |SCA , SC{b1,··· ,bi−1}) = tβ
H(SCbi |WC , SCA , SC{b1,··· ,bi−1}) = 0,
(32)
from which we further obtain 
H(SCB |SCA )
=
i=d−k+t∑
i=1
H(SCbi |SCA , SC{b1,··· ,bi−1})
= (d− k + t)tβ
(33)
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and

H(SCB |WC , SCA )
=
i=d−k+t∑
i=1
H(SCbi |WC , SCA , SC{b1,··· ,bi−1})
= 0.
(34)
According to equation (33), we further know H(SCB ) = (d−k+t)tβ, with which we obtain H(SCb ) = tβ
for any b ∈ B. Due to the randomness of the choice of the two sets A and B, we can also deduce
H(SCA ) = (k − t)tβ for |A| = k − t < k. Thus, combining equation (33), we get

H(SCA∪B)
= H(SCA ) +H(S
C
B |SCA )
= (d− k + t)tβ + (k − t)tβ
= dtβ.
(35)
Based on the above proof, it is obvious that equation (29) still holds, when t = k and A = Ø.
Remark 5 Since it is trivial that H(SCA∪B) ≤ dtβ, equation (35) exactly means that there are no in-
tersection pattern within the repair data SCA∪B, i.e., all the contents of repair data S
C
A∪B are mutually
independent when t ≤ k. In addition, we have the following observations:
1. When t ≤ k, equation (35) further implies that dtβ ≤ kα as the total information entropy of data
storage is kα, which leads to (d − k)(k − t)β ≥ 0. When k > t, it must be that d ≥ k. When t = k, if
d < k, the two terms of equation (7) will be contradictory. Thus, it must be that d ≥ k when t ≤ k.
2. When t > k, the second term of equation (7) H(WC |SCD) = 0 means that kα ≤ dtβ, which is
equivalent to (d− k)(t− k)β ≥ 0. Hence, it also can be derived that d ≥ k in this case.
3. Both cases show that there do not exist MSCR codes with d < k.
Furthermore, it is interesting to find that when t ≥ k and d = k, it must be that H(SCD) = dtβ, because
α = (d− k + t)β = tβ which leads to kα = H(WC) ≤ H(SCD) ≤ dtβ = kα. In other words, there are also
no intersection pattern within the repair data SCD when t ≥ k and d = k.
Lemma 3. For any MSCR code with parameter set {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′}, consider any single repair
of node i in a repair group {i, C ′} and two other disjoint subsets A′ and B′ such that {|C ′| = t−1, |A′| =
k − 1, |B′| = d− k + 1, (A′ ∪B′) ∩ C ′ = Ø, i /∈ {A′ ∪B′ ∪ C ′}}, it must be that
{
H(SiA′∪B′ , S
i
C′) = (d+ t− 1)β
H(SiB′ , S
i
C′ |Wi, SiA′) = 0.
(36)
Proof. We let B′ = {b′1, · · · , b′d−k+1} and C ′ = {c′1, · · · , c′t−1}. Then, we have
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
H(Wi|SiA′)−H(Wi|SiA′ , Sib′1)
= I(Wi;S
i
b′1
|SiA′)
= H(Sib′1 |S
i
A′)−H(Sib′1 |Wi, S
i
A′)
≤ H(Sib′1)
≤ β;
...
...
H(Wi|SiA′ , Sib′1 , S
i
b′2
, · · · , Sib′d−k)−H(Wi|S
i
A′ , S
i
B′)
= I(Wi;S
i
b′d−k+1
|SiA′ , SiB′\{b′d−k+1})
= H(Sib′d−k+1
|SiA′ , SiB′\{b′d−k+1})−H(S
i
b′d−k+1
|Wi, SiA′ , SiB′\{b′d−k+1})
≤ H(Sib′d−k+1)
≤ β;
(37)
and 
H(Wi|SiA′ , SiB′)−H(Wi|SiA′ , SiB′ , Sic′1)
= I(Wi;S
i
c′1
|SiA′∪B′)
= H(Sic′1 |S
i
A′∪B′)−H(Sic′1 |Wi, S
i
A′∪B′)
≤ H(Sic′1)
≤ β′;
...
...
H(Wi|SiA′∪B′ , Sic′1 , · · · , S
i
c′t−2
)−H(Wi|SiA′∪B′ , SiC′)
= I(Wi;S
i
c′t−1
|SiA′∪B′ , SiC′\{c′t−1})
= H(Sic′t−1 |S
i
A′∪B′ , S
i
C′\{c′t−1})−H(S
i
c′t−1
|Wi, SiA′∪B′ , SiC′\{c′t−1})
≤ H(Sic′t−1)
≤ β′.
(38)
By summing up all the inequalities (37) and (38) along with the fact that β = β′ in the MSCR
scenario, we derive
α = H(Wi|SiA′)−H(Wi|SiA′∪B′ , SiC′) ≤ (d+ t− k)β, (39)
from which all the inequalities (37) and (38) mandatorily become the equations similar to Lemma 2.
Thus, we get the proof.
Remark 6 According to the second term of equation (36), we naturally derive{
H(SiB′ |Wi, SiA′) = 0
H(SiC′ |Wi, SiA′) = 0,
(40)
using which we can further simplify H(S˜F |WE ,WF ).
4.3 Properties of Stable MSCR Codes
Some properties of stable MSCR codes are present as follows. Here, we should know that stable MSCR
codes also have the above properties of general MSCR codes in Lemma 2 and 3, since stable MSCR codes
still are MSCR codes.
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Lemma 4. For any stable MSCR code with parameter set {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′}, we have4
S˜F = {WF , SF }, (41)
from which we further obtain
H(S˜F |WE ,WF ) = H(SF |WE ,WF ) = H(SFG |WE ,WF ) = H(SFG), (42)
where G is a set of size (k− l1 − l2) and is disjoint with E and F as defined in the eavesdropping model.
Proof. The proof is separated into two parts as below.
1. First, we know for any i ∈ F , S˜i = {SiD, SiC\{i}|i ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜[1, n] \C, |C| = t, |D| = d}. The
“stable” property of MSCR codes will lead to that
S˜i = {Si[1,n]\{i}, SiC\{i}|i ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n], |C| = t}, (43)
where we claim again that exchanging data {Sij |i, j ∈ C} does not have the “stable” constraints and may
vary depending on different repair groups C. In addition, it must be that H(Wi, S
i|S˜i) = 0 from equation
(6). The following shows that the exchanging data {SiC\{i}|C⊂˜[1, n], |C| = t} is a function of the content
of {Wi, Si[1,n]\{i}}, where Si[1,n]\{i} can be replaced by Si.
For any repair group C including i, there always exists some set A′′ such that A′′ ∩ C = Ø and
|A′′| = k − 1, because d ≥ k. Then, according to the second term of equation (40) in Lemma 3, we have
H(SiC\{i}|Wi, SiA′′) = 0. (44)
Thereby, we derive 
H(S˜i|Wi, Si)
= H(Si{C\{i}|i∈C,C⊂˜[1,n]}|Wi, S
i)
= H(Si{C\{i}|i∈C,C⊂˜[1,n]}|Wi, S
i
A′′ , S
i
[1,n]\{i∪A′′})
= 0.
(45)
Therefore, from H(Wi, S
i|S˜i) = H(S˜i|Wi, Si) = 0, we naturally have {S˜i} = {Wi, Si} and further
get {S˜F } = {WF , SF }.
2. Assume all the n nodes are comprised of E,F,G, T , where |E ∪ F ∪ G| = k and |T | = n − k. So,
we have 
H(S˜F |W{E,F})
= H(WF , S
F |W{E,F})
= H(SF |W{E,F})
= H(SFE,F,G,T |W{E,F})
= H(SFG,T |W{E,F})
= H(SFG |W{E,F}) +H(SFT |W{E,F}, SFG).
(46)
4 Lemma 4 shows that it does not matter if the exchanging data in the stable MSCR scenario is restricted
to be fixed or not, because the exchanging data {SiC\{i}|i ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n]} is only a function of the content
of {Wi, Si[1,n]\{i}}. In other words, the total information of the exchanging data {SiC\{i}|i ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n]} is
included in {Wi, Si[1,n]\{i}}. So, when calculating the amount of the eavesdropped data, we do not need to
consider the exchanging data {SiC\{i}|i ∈ C,C⊂˜[1, n]}, while we only need to focus on the combination of some
node’s storage and its repair data {Wi, Si}.
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Then for any i ∈ F , 
H(SiT |W{E,F}, SFG)
≤ H(SiT |W{E,F}, SiG)
= H(SiT |Wi,W{E,F}\{i}, SiG)
≤ H(SiT |Wi, Si{E,F}\{i}, SiG)
= H(SiT |Wi, Si{E,F,G}\{i}).
(47)
Based on the first term of equation (40) and the fact that |{E,F,G} \ {i}| = k − 1, we obtain
H(SiT ′ |W{E,F}, SFG) = 0, (48)
where T ′ can be any subset of T of size d − k + 1. Owing to the randomness of T ′, we can deduce that
H(SiT |W{E,F}, SFG) = 0, which further leads to H(SFT |W{E,F}, SFG) = 0. Furthermore, it is trivial that
H(SFG |WE ,WF ) = H(SFG).
Remark 7 From the above proof, we can easily find that the formulation H(S˜F |WF ) = H(SFG) still
holds, when E = Ø and |F ∪ G| = k. However, it should be noted that, unlike MSR codes, MSCR codes
do not necessarily have the property that H(Wi|Si) = 0. MSCR codes only have a similar format that
H(Wi|S˜i) = 0 instead.
Lemma 5. In the stable MSCR scenario, for any subset F such that |F | ≤ k− 1, and arbitrary different
i1, i2 where i1, i2 /∈ F , we have H(SFi1) = H(SFi2). Furthermore, we have
• When t ≤ k, for any |F | ≤ t, we always have H(SFi ) = |F |β, where i /∈ F .
• When t ≥ k and d = k,5 for any |F | ≤ t, we still have H(SFi ) = |F |β, where i /∈ F .
Proof. We present them as the following two parts.
1. From Lemma 4 and Remark 7, we have
H(S˜F )
= H(SF ,WF )
= H(WF ) +H(S
F |WF )
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
G′ |WF )
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
G′),
(49)
where G′ is a random subset of [1, n] such that |G′ ∪ F | = k and G′ ∩ F = Ø. Since |F | ≤ k − 1, then
|G′| ≥ 1.
When |G′| = 1, for any two different g1 and g2 where g1, g2 ∈ {[1, n] \ F},
H(S˜F ) = H(WF ) +H(S
F
g1) = H(WF ) +H(S
F
g2), (50)
which indicates H(SFg1) = H(S
F
g2).
When |G′| ≥ 2, we set G′ = {g′, G1} and G′′ = {g′′, G1} such that {g′ 6= g′′, |G′| = |G′′| = k−|F |, G′∩
F = G′′ ∩ F = Ø}. Similarly, we obtain
H(S˜F )
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
G′)
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
g′) +H(S
F
G1);
H(S˜F )
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
G′′)
= H(WF ) +H(S
F
g′′) +H(S
F
G1),
(51)
5 In the situation when t ≥ k and d = k, we should know that if k ≤ |F | ≤ t, the formulation that H(SFi ) = |F |β
still holds.
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which implies H(SFg′) = H(S
F
g′′).
Because of the randomness of choices of (g1, g2) and (g
′, g′′), we have H(SFi1) = H(S
F
i2
) for arbitrary
different i1, i2 where i1, i2 /∈ F .
2. Remark 5 in Lemma 2 shows that in the situations when t ≤ k or when t ≥ k and d = k, contents
of any repair data (from any helper nodes set D to any repair group C) are mutually independent. Due to
the random choices of C and D and the stable repair property, we obtain for any |F | ≤ t, H(SFi ) = |F |β,
where i /∈ F .
5 MAIN RESULTS ON SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we will use a simple formulation to present a generally applicable expression of secrecy
capacity for stable MSCR codes. Then, we give some specific results on the secrecy capacity of stable
MSCR codes. At last, we take the stable MSCR code as an example to verify the secrecy capacity obtained
from information theory.
5.1 Simple Expression of Secrecy Capacity
Leveraging the lemmas we obtain before, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any stable MSCR code with parameter set {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′},
B(s) = (k − l1 − l2)(α−H(SFg )), (52)
where g ∈ G, |G| = k − l1 − l2 and |F | = l2 ≤ l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1.
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 mean that, for the stable MSCR codes, we have the following expression
of secrecy capacity
B(s) = (k − l1 − l2)α−H(SFG), (53)
where |G| = k − l1 − l2 and l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1.
Lemma 5 indicates that, in the stable MSCR scenario, for any subset F such that |F | ≤ k− 1 and for
arbitrary g1, g2 ∈ G, we have
H(SFg1) = H(S
F
g2). (54)
From the equations (53) and (54), we naturally obtain the expression (52).
Remark 8 The formulation (52) can be regarded as the simplest way to define the secrecy capacity of
stable MSCR codes, since we only need to concentrate on SFg , the repair data sent from single node g,
where g ∈ G.
5.2 Some Results on Secrecy Capacity
Putting all together, we give the following result.
Theorem 2. Given a stable MSCR code with {n ≥ d+ t, k, d, t, α, β, β′}, for l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1, we have
B(s) = (k − l1 − l2)(α− pi(β, l2)), (55)
where
pi(β, l2) = l2β, for
{
l2 ≤ t ≤ k;
or t > k and d = k.
(56)
Proof. Lemma 5 and Theorem 1 directly lead to
B(s) = (k − l1 − l2)(α− l2β) = (k − l1 − l2)(d− k + t− l2)β, (57)
when l2 ≤ t ≤ k or when t > k and d = k.
Remark 9 The above theorem is only applicable to stable MSCR codes. The authors in [43] give a similar
result in the situation when d = k and l2 ≤ t, while they only consider under single repair group.
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5.3 Specific Calculation of Secrecy Capacity
Here, we are to analyze the specific secrecy capacity of the stable MSCR code obtained in Section 3.2.
Without loss of generality, we assume the eavesdropper can observe the content of nodes set {E =
[1, l1]} and the repair downloads of nodes set {F = [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]}, where l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1. Thus, the
eavesdropper has the knowledge of{
W[1,l1]; S˜
[l1+1,l1+l2] = {SiD, Si{C\i}|i ∈ C ∩ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2], C⊂˜[1, n], D⊂˜([1, n] \ C)}
}
, (58)
where C denotes the repair group, D is the set of helper nodes and ⊂˜ means traversing. Interestingly,
we find that Sij = m
′T
j gi is also invariant in this stable MSCR code, while we assume it may vary with
different repair groups. We make the calculation in detail as follows.
First, we have W[1,l1] = {mTi gj |i = 1, 2, · · · , t; j = 1, · · · , l1}, where (m1,m2, · · · ,mt) is the original
data packets.
Second, we have
S˜[l1+1,l1+l2]
= S[l1+1,l1+l2] ∪ S[l1+1,l1+l2]
=
{
m′Ti · [g1, · · · ,gi−1,gi+1, · · · ,gn], [m′1, · · · ,m′i−1,m′i+1, · · · ,m′n]T · gi|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]
}
.
=
{
g′Ti · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [g1, · · · ,gi−1,gi+1, · · · ,gn]|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]
}
∪ {[g′1, · · · ,g′i−1,g′i+1, · · · ,g′n]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · gi|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]} ,
(59)
where{
S[l1+1,l1+l2] =
{
g′Ti · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [g1, · · · ,gi−1,gi+1, · · · ,gn]|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]
}
S[l1+1,l1+l2] =
{
[g′1, · · · ,g′i−1,g′i+1, · · · ,g′n]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · gi|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]
}
.
(60)
Now, we are to verify some properties of stable MSCR codes.
Verification 1. According to the first part of Lemma 4, we should have
S˜[l1+1,l1+l2] = {W[l1+1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2]}, (61)
where W[l1+1,l1+l2] = [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [gl1+1, · · · ,gl1+l2 ]. Since any t× t submatrix of G′ is invertible,
we can directly deduce {
H(S[l1+1,l1+l2]|W[l1+1,l1+l2]) = 0
H(W[l1+1,l1+l2]|S[l1+1,l1+l2]) = 0,
(62)
that naturally leads to S[l1+1,l1+l2] = W[l1+1,l1+l2] and further verifies the first part of Lemma 4
S˜[l1+1,l1+l2] = S[l1+1,l1+l2] ∪ S[l1+1,l1+l2] = {W[l1+1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2]}. (63)
Here, it should be noted that the property S[l1+1,l1+l2] = W[l1+1,l1+l2] is not applicable to any stable
MSCR codes and is only feasible in this special stable MSCR code6.
6 Although Lemma 4 leads to S˜[l1+1,l1+l2] = S[l1+1,l1+l2] ∪ S[l1+1,l1+l2] = {W[l1+1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2]} that cor-
responds to equation (63), we cannot derive that S[l1+1,l1+l2] = W[l1+1,l1+l2] for any stable MSCR codes.
The reason is that S[l1+1,l1+l2] and W[l1+1,l1+l2] are not independent with S
[l1+1,l1+l2], i.e., there exists the
intersection pattern between S[l1+1,l1+l2] and S[l1+1,l1+l2] as well as between W[l1+1,l1+l2] and S
[l1+1,l1+l2].
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Verification 2. Then, we have {W[1,l1], S˜[l1+1,l1+l2]} = {W[1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2]}, which is the infor-
mation leakage obtained by the eavesdropper. From the second part of Lemma 4, it should be that
H(W[1,l1+l2], S
[l1+1,l1+l2])
= H(W[1,l1+l2]) +H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]|W[1,l1+l2])
= H(W[1,l1+l2]) +H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[l1+l2+1,k]
).
(64)
As we know,{
W[1,l1+l2] = [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [g1, · · · ,gl1+l2 ]
S[l1+1,l1+l2] =
{
g′Ti · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [g1, · · · ,gi−1,gi+1, · · · ,gn]|i ∈ [l1 + 1, l1 + l2]
}
,
(65)
from which we have{
H(S[l1+1,l1+l2]|W[1,l1+l2])
= H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[l1+l2+1,k]
|W[1,l1+l2]) +H(S[l1+1,l1+l2][k+1,n] |W[1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2][l1+l2+1,k] ).
(66)
Because any k×k submatrix of G is invertible, we know that [g1, · · · ,gl1+l2 ] and [gl1+l2+1, · · · ,gk] are mu-
tually independent. Based on this observation, we can derive H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[l1+l2+1,k]
|W[1,l1+l2]) = H(S[l1+1,l1+l2][l1+l2+1,k] ).
In addition, given the following formulations{
W[1,l1+l2] = [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [g1, · · · ,gl1+l2 ]
S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[l1+l2+1,k]
=
{
[g′l1+1, · · · ,g′l1+l2 ]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [gl1+l2+1, · · · ,gk]
}
,
(67)
we can obtain [g′l1+1, · · · ,g′l1+l2 ]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T for the invertiblity of [g1, · · · ,gk], with which
we further derive
{
S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[k+1,n] = [g
′
l1+1
, · · · ,g′l1+l2 ]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · [gk+1, · · · ,gn]
}
. That exactly
means H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[k+1,n] |W[1,l1+l2], S[l1+1,l1+l2][l1+l2+1,k] ) = 0. Thus, the second part of Lemma 4 is also verified.
Verification 3. Finally, we can easily deduce that the size of information leakage obtained by the
eavesdropper is precisely equal to
H(W[1,l1], S˜
[l1+1,l1+l2])
= H(W[1,l1+l2]) +H(S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
[l1+l2+1,k]
)
= (l1 + l2)α+
k∑
g=l1+l2+1
H(S[l1+1,l1+l2]g ),
(68)
where S
[l1+1,l1+l2]
g = [g′l1+1, · · · ,g′l1+l2 ]T · [m1,m2, · · · ,mt]T · gg. Because any t × t submatrix of G′ is
invertible, we have
H(S[l1+1,l1+l2]g ) =
{
l2β if l2 ≤ t;
tβ if l2 ≥ t.
(69)
Combining equations (68) and (69), we obtain, for l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1,
B(s) =
{
(k − l1 − l2)(α− l2β) if l2 ≤ t;
0 if l2 ≥ t,
(70)
where α = (d− k + t)β = tβ.
As we can see, this above result is exactly one special case of our Theorem 2 when d = k.
Remark 10 As shown in section 3.1.2, the original MSCR code given in [41] has poor secrecy capacity
and may lose all the data secrecy in some cases even when l2 = 1. In contrast, the stable MSCR code built
from conversion apparently offers better secrecy capacity and always provides the positive secrecy capacity
whenever l2 < t and l1 + l2 ≤ k − 1, see equation (70).
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6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the secrecy capacity of minimum storage cooperative regenerating codes. We
recognize a critical detail of the repair strategy, that is, the content of repair data may vary depending
on the choice of the repair group or the set of helper nodes, which was neglected by the previous studies
[43]. Thereby, we introduce a new type of codes called the “stable” MSCR codes, where the repair data is
independent of the repair groups and the sets of helper nodes. Towards it, we find the two MSCR codes
proposed in [40,41] actually are not stable while we convert the MSCR code given in [41] to a stable one,
which has better secrecy capacity than the original one. In addition, we utilize information theory to give
some specific results on secrecy capacity.
Although we present some results on data secrecy of MSCR codes, there are still many related research
questions for further exploring. First, more examples of MSCR codes and stable MSCR codes need to
be further explored. Second, we need to derive the characterization of secrecy capacity in more diverse
situations than considered in this paper.
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